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But over time, little evidence has emerged to confirm this suspicion. Many journalists have tried to follow the clues. There was a house in Abbottabad, near Bin Laden with a brass plate and the name of an adult. Was he an archer? He denied it. There were architectural drawings that were submitted for consent planning for the construction of the house. Architects were supposed to have ISI connections. Had a security house been built? The architects have denied. The rejection may not represent much, but other indications show a lack of complicity of the state. Washington’s credible reports indicated that the CIA had heard calls from the ISI army and chiefs following the attack and came to the conclusion that they were very surprised by what happened.
Based on published literature and, more importantly, interviews with Al-Qaida employees and bin Laden family members Scott-Clark and Levy, trying to answer the question of how much Pakistan knew. Exile concludes that while Kayani and Pasha general ignorant, a former ISI chief knew the house in Abbottabad. General Hamid Gul, who died in 2015, was for many years one of Islamabad’s most prominent Islamist. He was ISI’s general director from 1987 to 1989. Benjamin Bhutto was quickly eliminated when he became prime minister. Gul avant-garde decision, but remained a very active and prominent figure, which has become a focal point for violent jihadists. Scott-Clark and Levy believe that Gul not only knew where Ben Laden was protected, but also the Al Qaeda leader using his influence on the ISI wing, which, they say, “is known to be virtually independent. Of ISI “.
The coincidences between ISI and violent jihadist outfits are so many and opaque that it is difficult to know where one ends and the other begins. Some activists are on the state payroll but retain a degree of independence. Some ISI agents withdrew to join militant groups, but occasionally check their former employer. However, the claim that certain ISI officials who have made independent decisions on a sensitive issue such as that of Ben Laden is highly controversial. The ISI may be much less capable than is often described. It could be so obsessed with the secret part of the organization does not know what another. Despite Scott-Clark and Levy’s claims, many ISI observers continue to believe that the chain of command remains intact and that if a protection group of the lower ranks of Ben Laden, executives would have known.
Exile also tells the fascinating story of Al Qaeda in Iran. For years, fragments of information have emerged from how Iran has protected some of the main associates of Ben Laden and nearby after September 11. Many have treated these statements with great skepticism. Is it really plausible, did they think Iran would provide shelter to the violent Sunni and Shiite jihadists? Scott-Clark and Levy provide a mass of new details about what happened. It is a story of missed opportunities. Since September 11, officials in Washington and Tehran have realized that the attack could allow the two countries to begin cooperating with their common enemy: Al Qaeda and the Taliban. On September 15, 2001, a senior United States Department of State, Ryan Crocker, and Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif launched a series of in-person meetings in Geneva, in which Iran shared information on the Taliban and Other-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But Washington’s reluctance to accept radical Iranian aid means that reconciliation efforts were fragmented. And when, in January 2002, President Bush gave his speech on the “axis of evil”, whose goal is Iran, which totally block.