The Exile by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy review – Osama Bin Laden after 9/11
At the time of the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington, Osama bin Laden in a cave in Afghanistan, unable to get a decent satellite TV signal and have to follow the development of the radio. The contrast between their situation and their impact was to be a theme for the next decade until, finally, Americans have caught up in the foray into Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011. It is a decade described by exile with a remarkable amount Impressive new details.
Research journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy begin with a detailed description of Ben Laden’s movements. When the US airstrikes began, he went through several locations in Afghanistan while trying to manage the movements of his wives and children. He was heading to a meeting with Mullah Omar in Kandahar on October 7, 2001, when an American drone almost died. From there, he moved to an underground complex in the Tora Bora mountains, near the border with Pakistan. The United States attacked Tora Bora, but again, Laden managed to escape, and December 14, 2001, appeared in the Pakistani city of Karachi. Feeling too exposed there, she returned to Afghanistan in February 2002 before reaching northern Pakistan in the summer. There he lived with one of his wives, Amal, and his nine-month-old daughter, Safiyah, in the remote village of Kutkey, home to the political family of their messenger and custody service, Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.
Ben Laden felt vulnerable, especially after February 28, 2003, when the chief architect of the Sept. 11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was arrested in Rawalpindi shortly after his stay in Kutkey. Kuwait, fearing that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is forced to speak, Ben Laden rushed to move into an uninhabited house belonging to his father near Kohat in northwestern Pakistan. It was an unsatisfactory solution and, in 2004, Al-Qaeda, eager to settle down and protect its leader, had managed to get a better house for him in the military town of Abbottabad. In August 2004, Ben Laden, with a growing procession of women and children, moved.
The main question that was posed after the incursion into Abbottabad refers to Pakistan’s two most powerful men, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, Army Chief of Staff and General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the Director General’s chief intelligence agency, The ISI. Did you know that Ben Laden was hiding in Pakistan? Much of the answer. Many people in Washington believe that Pakistan was not only an unreliable ally, but a duplication. The firm evidence that had given asylum to the architect of September 11 would make the country the past state sponsor of terrorism.
There was no reason to believe that senior Pakistani officials knew. First, it was hard to believe that Ben Laden could have lived a few miles from the Military Academy of Pakistan without the army being aware of his presence. Second, Pakistan recorded a balance of protection and patronage of violent jihadists and lies. And, finally, the whole story seemed consistent with the ISI modus operandi. For years, Pakistan has avoided the crisis in its relations with Washington conveniently adopting an Al Qaeda leader as a former US official headed to Islamabad to read the primer. ISI has preferred to keep their charts until they can be replicated for maximum profits. Ben Laden, the highest card of all, will reproduce when Islamabad desperately needs it. Therefore, many writers and journalists who closely follow Pakistan and many Pakistanis were also predisposed to believe that the ISI and the army have probably experienced.